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CLOUD FORENSICS INVESTIGATION: TRACING
INFRINGING SHARING OF COPYRIGHTED CONTENT IN
CLOUD
Yi-Jun He, Echo P. Zhang, Lucas C.K. Hui, Siu Ming Yiu, K.P. Chow
Department of Computer Science, The University of Hong Kong
Phone: +852-22415725; Fax: +852-25598447;
E-mail:{yjhe, pzhang2, hui, smyiu, chow}@cs.hku.hk
ABSTRACT
Cloud Computing is becoming a significant technology trend nowadays, but its abrupt rise also creates
a brand new front for cybercrime investigation with various challenges. One of the challenges is to
track down infringing sharing of copyrighted content in cloud. To solve this problem, we study a
typical type of content sharing technologies in cloud computing, analyze the challenges that the new
technologies bring to forensics, formalize a procedure to get digital evidences and obtain analytical
results based on the evidences to track down illegal uploader. Furthermore, we propose a reasoning
model based on the probability distribution in a Bayesian Network to evaluate the analytical result of
forensics examinations. The proposed method can accurately and scientifically track down the origin
infringing content uploader and owner.
Keywords: cloud forensics, peer to peer, file sharing, tracking, CloudFront
1. INTRODUCTION
With broadband Internet connection and with P2P programs such as Gnutella, FrostWire, BearShare,
BitTorrent, and eMule, it takes very little effort for someone to download songs, movies, or computer
games. But nowadays, people make use of it to share copyrighted files, or even images of child sexual
exploitation. Since October 2009, over 300,000 unique installations of Gnutella have been observed
sharing known child pornography in the US. Thus, many research works have been focused on
criminal investigations of the trafficking of digital contraband on Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file sharing
networks (Chow et al. 2009, Ieong et al. 2009, Ieong et al. 2010, Liberatore et al. 2010).
Recently, cloud computing has been dramatically developed and will soon become the dominant IT
environment. It is a new computing platform where thousands of users around the world can access to
a shared pool of computing resources (e.g., storage, applications, services, etc.) without having to
download or install everything on their own computers, and only requires a minimal management
effort from the service provider. Several big service providers, Amazon, Apple, Google, etc. start to
provide content sharing services in cloud which can offer the file sharing functionalities like what P2P
networks can offer. With the cloud environment, file sharing becomes more convenient and efficient,
since sharing can be done through web browser without requiring software installation, and cloud
provides strong computation power and fast transmitting speed. Thus it is possible that cloud based
content sharing will substitute the existing file sharing programs one day.
1.1 Can Existing Investigative Models be Applied to Cloud Computing?
Before cloud computing emerging, most forensics investigation models are built on P2P networks.
When cloud based infringing content sharing happens, can existing investigative model for analyzing
P2P network be applied to analyze cloud based file sharing network? The answer is NO, because
cloud content sharing systems differentiate from P2P sharing systems in the following aspects:
1. Cloud Computing provides storage capacity at dedicate, and data is automatically
geographically dispersed on edge servers on the cloud; while P2P file sharing systems support
the trading of storage capacity between a network of ’peers’.
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2. Typically, Cloud file sharing systems operate in a centralized fashion that end user is directed
to an edge server that is near them to get data based on a complex load balancing process; but
P2P services operate in a decentralized way that nodes on the Internet cooperate in an overlay
network consisting of peers, where each peer is both a consumer and a producer of data and
gets different piece of data from other peers.
3. Further, cloud file sharing services are paid services, where the user pays, for instance, per
amount of data kept in storage and the amount of network traffic generated to upload or
download files. Contrary to cloud storage services, P2P file sharing systems are typically not
subscription based, but rather depend on group members that are part of a peer network to
trade resources, primarily disk capacity and network bandwidth.
1.2 Contributions
This is the first paper providing accurate investigations of such content sharing networks in cloud. We
analyze the functionality a typical cloud content sharing system: CloudFront, formalize an
investigation procedure, and build an analysis model on it. Our research can help investigators:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Confidently state from where and how various forms of evidences are acquired in cloud;
Understand the relative strength of each evidence;
Validate that evidences from the fruits of a search warrant;
Assess the accuracy of the investigation result based on the evidences obtained using a
Bayesian network.

In section 2, we give an overview of related works. In section 3, we introduce the background of the
content sharing system. In section 4, we simulate the crime, and describe the investigation process. In
section 5, we propose a Bayesian Network based model to obtain analytical results based on the
evidences. In section 6, we analyze the proposed model in several aspects. Finally, we conclude the
whole paper.
2. RELATED WORK
Many works have been proposed to solve security and privacy problems in the cloud field (Angin et
al. 2010, Bertino et al. 2009, He et al. 2012). They focus on aspects for protecting user privacy and
anonymous authentication. Works (Wang et al. 2010, Wang et al. 2011) improve data security in
cloud using crypto technologies.
Also, traditional computer forensics have already had many works published on how to establish
principles and guidelines to retrieve digital evidence (Grance et al. 2006). Works (Aitken et al. 2004,
Kwan et al. 2007) show how to formulate hypotheses from evidence and evaluate the hypotheses’
likelihood for the sake of legal arguments in court. In addition, the aspects of forensics in tracking
infringing files sharing in P2P networks have been addressed by several works (Chow et al. 2009,
Ieong et al. 2009, Ieong et al. 2010, Liberatore et al. 2010).
In contrast with the maturity of research on cloud security and privacy and traditional computer
forensics, the research on forensic investigations in cloud computing are relatively immature. To the
best of knowledge, our paper is the first work addressing the problem of tracking infringing sharing of
copyrighted content in the cloud. There are other works (Birk et al. 2011, Marty 2011, Zafarullah et al.
2011) discussing the issues of forensic investigations in cloud, but (Marty 2011, Zafarullah et al.
2011) focus on how to log the data needed for forensic investigations, (Birk et al. 2011) gives an
overview on forensic investigations issues without providing concrete solutions or investigation
model.
3. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide a technical overview of a content sharing system: CloudFront, which is a
typical cloud based content sharing network.
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Amazon CloudFront (Amazon 2012) is a web service for content delivery. It delivers your content
through a worldwide network of edge locations. End users are routed to the nearest edge location, so
content is delivered with the best possible performance.
A CloudFront network is made up of four types of entities:



Objects are the files that the file owner wants CloudFront to deliver. This typically
includes web pages, images, and digital media files, but can be anything that can be
served over HTTP or a version of RTMP.



Origin Server is the location where you store the original, definitive version of your
objects.



Distribution is a link between your origin server and a domain name that CloudFront
automatically assigns. If your origin is an Amazon S3 bucket, you use this new
domain name in place of standard Amazon S3 references. For example,
http://mybucket.s3.amazonaws.com/image.jpg would instead be
http://somedomainname.cloudfront.net/image.jpg.



Edge location is a geographical site where CloudFront caches copies of your objects.
When an end user requests one of your objects, CloudFront decides which edge
location is best able to serve the request. If the edge location doesn’t have a copy,
CloudFront goes to the origin server and puts a copy of the object in the edge
location.

To share a file using CloudFront, the file owner first makes and publishes a distribution. The process
is shown in Figure 1 and it includes:
1. Register an account on the origin server, and place objects in the origin server and make them
publicly readable.
2. Create CloudFront distribution and get the distribution’s domain name that CloudFront
assigns. Example distribution ID: EDFDVBD632BHDS5, and Example domain name:
d604721fxaaqy9.cloudfront.net. The distribution ID will not necessarily match the domain
name.
3. Create the URLs that end users will use to get the objects and include them as needed in any
web application or website. Example URL:
http://d604721fxaaqy9.cloudfront.net/videos/video.mp4.

Fig. 1. The working protocol of Amazon CloudFront.
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To download a shared file from CloudFront, the end user needs to do the following steps. For
simplicity, we assume the end user resides in Hong Kong.
1. After clicking the URL from the web application or website, CloudFront determines which
edge location would be best to serve the object. In this case, it is the Hong Kong location.
2. If the Hong Kong edge location doesn’t have a copy of video.mp4, CloudFront goes to the
origin server and puts a copy of video.mp4 in the Hong Kong edge location.
3. The Hong Kong edge location then serves video.mp4 to the end user and then serves any other
requests for that file at the Hong Kong location.
4. Later, video.mp4 expires, and CloudFront deletes video.mp4 from the Hong Kong location.
CloudFront doesn’t put a new copy of video.mp4 in the Hong Kong location until an end user
requests video.mp4 again and CloudFront determines the Hong Kong location should serve the
image.
4. INVESTIGATION PROCESS
The objective of investigation is to obtain evidences through observation of data from the Internet and
other possible parties, such as service providers or seized devices. In this section, we discuss
techniques and methods for collecting evidences from Amazon CloudFront.
As the cloud based content sharing is new, we do not have a real case in Hong Kong to study. Thus we
have to suppose there is a crime and simulate the whole crime process based on the most common and
regular criminal behaviors, and find out what evidences the criminal may leave. Our paper gives a
good guidance for collecting evidences if a real case happens in the future.
In this part, we simulate a suspect intends to share infringing files using Amazon CloudFront. A
general case is that the suspect has a movie in his computer and wants to share the movie publicly. The
suspect needs to do following steps:
1. Subscribe to Amazon CloudFront service, providing email address, user name and credit card
information to service provider.
2. Register an origin server, providing email address and user name to the server administrator.
3. Upload infringing files from local disk to the origin server. This step may involve installing a
FTP/FTPS/SFTP client software in order to do the uploading.
4. Login Amazon CloudFront to create a distribution for the infringing file. The distribution is
the URL link to the file in the CloudFront network.
5. Register a forum, and publish the distribution to the forum. When end users click the
distribution, CloudFront will retrieve the files from the nearest edge location.
Once such an illegal sharing happens, we can follow the guidance below to track the suspect:
First, we can trace the suspect file link uploader’s IP address through four steps (Ei represents
evidence i):
1. E1: The suspect posted the distribution, the posted message is found.
2. E2: The suspect has a forum account and he is logged in. So, the suspect’s forum account is
found.
3. E3: The IP address must be recorded by the forum. Check with the forum administrator for the
IP address of the user who created the posts.
4. E4: Check with Internet Service Providers for the assignment record of IP address to get its
subscribed user.
Through the above four steps, we are only sure that the suspect has posted a link on the forum, but not
sure about whether it is the same suspect who created the link. Thus the second step is to check with
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the CloudFront provider for four issues:
1. E5: The suspect has an Amazon CloudFront account, and logged in the CloudFront with the
tracked IP address.
2. E6: The origin server domain name is found under the suspect’s CloudFront account.
3. E7: The infringing file distribution creation record is found under the suspect’s CloudFront
account.
4. E8: The registered credit card holder of that CloudFront account is the suspect.
The third step is to check with the origin server administrator that the suspect is the infringing file
owner. The evidences include
1. E9: The suspect has an origin server account, and logged in the origin server with the tracked
IP address.
2. E10: The infringing file exists under the suspect origin server account.
The last step is to find out the devices that the suspect used to do the infringing file sharing. The
evidences include
1. E11: Hash value of the infringing file matches that of the file existing on the suspect’s devices
(including Tablet PC, Laptop, Desktop Computer or Mobile Phone).
2. E12: A FTP/FTPS/SFTP client software is installed on the devices.
3. E13: Origin server connection record is found in FTP/FTPS/SFTP client software.
4. E14: Infringing file transmission record is found in FTP/FTPS/SFTP client software.
5. E15: Cookie of the Origin server is found on the devices.
6. E16: Internet history record on Origin server is available.
7. E17: URL of Origin server is stored in the web browser.
8. E18: The distribution origin name is the origin server.
9. E19: Credit card charge record of CloudFront is found.
10. E20: Cookie of the CloudFront website is found.
11. E21: CloudFront service log-in record is found.
12. E22: Distribution creation record is found.
13. E23: Removing the file in origin server will affect the distribution validity.
14. E24: Web browser software is available on the devices.
15. E25: Internet connection is available.
16. E26: Internet history record on publishing forum is found.
17. E27: The distribution link posted on the forum is as the same as what is created in CloudFront.
18. E28: Cookie of the publishing forum is found.
5. THE PROPOSED MODEL FOR ANALYZING EVIDENCES
In this part, we construct a Bayesian model to analyze the evidences found above and calculate the
probability of guilt. We begin the construction with the set up of the top-most hypothesis, which is

Hypothesis H: “The suspect is the origin file owner and the uploader”
Usually, this hypothesis represents the main argument that the investigator wants to determine. It is the
root node. It is an ancestor of every other node in the Bayesian Network, hence its state’s probabilities
are unconditional. To support the root hypothesis, sub-hypotheses may be added to the Bayesian
Network, since they are useful for adjusting the model to a more clearly structured graph. As show in
Table 1, in the CloudFront model, four sub-hypotheses are created for the root node and four sub-subhypotheses are created for the hypothesis H4.
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Table 1. Hypotheses with CloudFront
H1
H2
H3
H4
H4-1
H4-2
H4-3
H4-4

The suspect posted a link to the forums.
The suspect created the link using CloudFront.
The suspect is the file owner.
The seized devices (including Tablet PC, Laptop, Desktop Computer, Mobile Phone)
have been used as the initial sharing machine to share infringing file on Internet.
Has the pirated file uploaded from the seized devices to the origin server?
Has the distribution on the origin server been created using CloudFront?
Has the connection between the seized devices and the CloudFront been maintained?
Has the distribution been posted to newsgroup forum for publishing?

The built Bayesian model is shown in Figure 2:

Fig. 2. Bayesian Network Diagram for Amazon CloudFront.
5.1 How To Use the Model for Assessment
Initialization Take the Bayesian network model for Amazon CloudFront as an example. The possible
states of all evidences are:“Yes, No, Uncertain”. All hypotheses are set to be “Unobserved” when
there is no observation made to any evidence. The initial prior probability P(H) is set to be Yes:
0.3333, No: 0.3333, Uncertain: 0.3333. The initial conditional probability value of each evidence is set
as shown in Figure 3. Take E9 as an example, we assign an initial value of 0.85 for the situation when
H3 and E9 are both “Yes”. That means when the suspect is the file owner, the chance that the suspect
has an origin server account, and logged in the origin server with the tracked IP address is 85%. The
resulting posterior probability P(Hi) and P(Hij), that is the certainty of Hi and Hij based on the
initialized probability values of evidences, should be evenly distributed amongst their states, as show
in Table 2.
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Fig. 3. The Initial Conditional Probabilities.
Table 2. Bayesian Network Initial Posterior Probability
Hypotheses
H1
H2
H3
H4
H4-1
H4-2
H4-3
H4-4

Initial Posterior Probability
Yes: 0.3333, No: 0.3333, Uncertain: 0.3333
Yes: 0.3333, No: 0.3333, Uncertain: 0.3333
Yes: 0.3333, No: 0.3333, Uncertain: 0.3333
Yes: 0.3333, No: 0.3333, Uncertain: 0.3333
Yes: 0.3333, No: 0.3333, Uncertain: 0.3333
Yes: 0.3333, No: 0.3333, Uncertain: 0.3333
Yes: 0.3333, No: 0.3333, Uncertain: 0.3333
Yes: 0.3333, No: 0.3333, Uncertain: 0.3333

Assessment In the investigation process, if an evidence Ei is found, then the state of that evidence
should be changed to “Yes”, and the prior probability P(Ei) should be set to 1. On the other hand, if
the evidence is not found, then the state of that evidence should be changed to “No” or “Uncertain”. If
“No”, the prior probability of that evidence should be 0; if “Uncertain”, the prior probability of that
evidence should be set subjectively between 0-1. If we assume all evidences are found, and switch all
the entailing evidences to state “Yes”, the propagated probability values of the hypotheses are shown
in Table 3. According to the Bayesian Network calculation, the posterior probability of H at state
“Yes” reaches the highest value 99.8819% under this circumstance, which means that there is a
maximum chance of 99.8819% that the suspect is the origin file owner and uploader.

Table 3. Propagated Probability Values of the Hypothesis
Hypotheses
H
H1
H2
H3
H4
H4−1
H4−2
H4−3
H4−4

Posterior probability when all evidences are found
Yes: 0.998819, No: 0.00118103, Uncertain: 0
Yes: 0.999823, No: 0.000177368, Uncertain: 0
Yes: 0.999823, No: 0.000177368, Uncertain: 0
Yes: 0.994364, No: 0.00563629, Uncertain: 0
Yes: 0.998967, No: 0.00103306, Uncertain: 0
Yes: 0.999999, No: 9.7077e-007, Uncertain: 0
Yes: 0.999994, No: 5.50123e-006, Uncertain: 0
Yes: 0.849277, No: 0.150723, Uncertain: 0
Yes: 0.999025, No: 0.000975118, Uncertain: 0
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However, in reality, some evidences may not be found, so we should correspondingly amend the
absent evidences states from “Yes” to “No”. For example, we assume the evidences E17, E10, E7 are not
found, thus we change the states of them from “Yes” to “No”. As a result, the posterior probability of
H at state “Yes” will be reduced from 99.8819% to 99.3379%. The result shows that the posterior
probability of H would be reduced if some evidences are absent.
We used the software “MSBNx” (Microsoft, 2001) to calculate the probability of the hypotheses. The
above analysis result of the root hypothesis tells the judge the probability that a hypothesis is true. In
our experiment, if all evidences are found, the probability would be more than 99%. The numerical
result is a good scientific reference to the judge. If real cases happen, investigators can use this model
to evaluate the digital forensics findings, and adjust the evidences found, thus get a quantitive
probability of the crime.
6. ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL
Though Bayesian Network has been used for a while in security and forensics, our analysis below
shows that its construction and usage in cloud has its own characteristics.
6.1 Difficulties in Building the Model
Following the guidances in section 4, it is not difficult to find out the origin file link uploader and file
owner. However, the nature of the cloud causes some difficulties when following our guidances to do
investigation.



First, in the cloud environment, file sharing is centrally controlled. Inevitably,
investigators need assistance from cloud service providers (SPs), such as Amazon, in
order to lock-in the suspect fast. However, many of the cloud SPs are international
organizations, so there are a number of restrictions placed on connecting evidences
from foreign organizations. Some of these restrictions are the decision of the foreign
Government, while others are the result of international organizations being unwilling
to leak customers information. Thus, one may wonder if the cloud SPs do not
collaborate with forensics investigators, does the model still work?



Fortunately, the following evaluation result of our model shows that, it is still possible
to track the suspect with a high probability even without the help from the cloud SP.
If without the help of cloud SP, E5...E8 would be absent. Thus, we set the states of
E5...E8 to be “No”, and keep the states of other evidences to be “Yes”. As a result,
P(H2) is dramatically reduced to 0.53%, and P(H) is reduced from 99.8819% to
96.38%. The result shows that, though the cloud SP is an important third party to
provide valuable evidences, its absence would not affect much of the final result when
other evidences are all found.



The second difficulty is that the suspect can use mobile phones or other persons’
computers to upload the files. Also, cloud computing allows using web based
technology, which makes content sharing easy from any device that supports a web
browser. As a result, investigators may not be able to get any evidence if just
investigate suspect’s personal computers, or may miss some important evidences
existing in other devices. Thus it expands the scope of the investigation. For example,
when finding the evidences supporting H4 in our model, investigators must investigate
all devices with browsers, including Tablet PC, laptop, desktop computer, mobile
phone.
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6.2 Sensitive Data Analysis
From the model, we can find some evidences which will have the greatest impact or the minimal
impact to the result, and some evidences which have the most interconnection with other evidences.
1. As show in Figure 3, if P(Ei|Hj) which is the initial posterior probability of each evidence Ei
caused by the hypothesis Hj is the same, for example, P(E1|H1) = P(E9|H3) = 0.85, then E9 and
E10 would have the most significant effect to the posterior probability of H. For example, if we
change the state of E9 from “Yes” to “No”, the P(H) will be reduced from 99.8819% to
99.43%. If changing any other evidence such as E1, the P(H) will be reduced from 99.8819%
to 99.86%.
2. If adopting the same initial posterior probability above, then E24 and E25 have the minimal
impact to P(H). If we change the state of E24 from “Yes” to “No”, the P(H) will be reduced
from 99.8819% to 99.8818%.
3. The hypothesis H4 is in a diverging connection with H4−1, H4−2, H4−3, H4−4, and H4−1 is in a
diverging connection with E11...E17, hence, provided the states of H4−1 and H4 are
unobservable, change in E11...E17 will also change the probability values of H4−1 and H4. When
H4−1 or H4 changes, the likelihood of E11...E17 will change also.
4. Similarly, since H, H4, H4−1 and E11 are in serial connection, hence change in E11 will also
propagate the variation to H if H4 and H4−1 remain unobservable.
5. Nodes E24 and E25 are common nodes for hypotheses H4−2, H4−3, H4−4. In other words, there is
a converging connection to E24 and E25 from hypothesis nodes H4−2, H4−3, H4−4. According to
the rules of probability propagation for converging connection in Bayesian network, when the
states of E24 and E25 are known, the probabilities of H4−2, H4−3, H4−4 will influence each other.
Therefore, change in the state of E24 or E25 will change the probability of these three
hypotheses. Further, since H4−1, H4−2, H4−3, H4−4 are in divergent connection with parent
hypothesis H4, hence changes in H4−2, H4−3, H4−4 will also influence the probability of H4−1.
6.3 Initial Probability Assignment
As show in Table 2 and Figure 3, for simplicity, in the initialization phase of assessment, we set the
initial prior probability P(H) to be Yes: 0.3333, No: 0.3333, Uncertain: 0.3333, and set the initial
posterior probability of each evidence Ei caused by the hypothesis Hj to be the same, such as P(E1|H1)
= P(E9|H3) =0.85. However, in reality, the assignment of initial prior probability and initial posterior
probability may not be like this. Such assignments often rely on subjective personal belief which is
affected by professional experience and knowledge. Also individual digital forensic examiner’s belief
may not represent the general and acceptable view in the forensic discipline. Thus, the assignment
needs to be done among a group of forensic specialists. In order to help investigators to perform a
more accurate assignment of the initial probability, we first classify the evidences into two levels in
section 6.4.
6.4 Critical Evidence Set of Evidences
The investigation found out 28 evidences. Each of them will affect P(H) in varying degrees. Thus we
classify the evidences into two levels, L0, L1 due to the degree of importance to H. L0 is the lowest
degree and L1 is the highest degree. The higher the more important. Please note that such
classification needs intensive understanding of each evidence, and it needs to be done by a group of
forensic specialists.



L1: E1, E3, E5, E7, E10, E11, E18, E22, E23, E27
L0: E2, E4, E6, E8, E9, E12, E13, E14, E15, E16, E17, E19, E24, E20, E21, E25, E26, E28

According to the critical set classification, we define the following 7 deductions, which helps
investigators to understand the logic relation among the evidences, and provides a basic knowledge to
investigators when assigning initial posterior probabilities to each evidence.
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1. If E1 and E3 are found, H1 would have a high probability to be true, no matter E2 or E4 is found
or not.
2. If E5 and E7 are found, H2 would have a high probability to be true, no matter E6 or E8 is found
or not.
3. If E10 is found, H3 would have a high probability to be true, no matter E9 is found or not.
4. If E11 is found, H4−1 would have a high probability to be true, no matter E12, E13, E14, E15, E16
or E17 is found or not.
5. If E18, E22, E23 are found, H4−2 would have a high probability to be true, no matter E19, E20, E21,
E24 or E25 is found or not.
6. If E23 is found, H4−3 would have a high probability to be true, no matter E24 or E25 is found or
not.
7. If E27 is found, H4−4 would have a high probability to be true, no matter E24, E25, E26, or E28 is
found or not.
Take deduction 1 as an example, it means that if the posted distribution and the poster’s IP address are
found, it is most likely that the suspect posted a distribution with this IP address. The existence of E2
or E4 will not affect much of the probability of H1. The basis of making such a deduction is that some
forums support anonymous posting or unregistered user posting, so E2 may not exist even if E1 and E3
are found; also the IP subscriber may not be the suspect because he can use public network for
posting, so E4 may not exist. Thus E2 and E4 are just supplementary evidences for H1, but not the
critical ones. Finally, according to deduction 1, investigators should assign higher initial probabilities
to E1 and E3, and lower posterior probabilities to E2 and E4. The exact posterior probabilities should be
carefully decided among specialists. Here, we just give an example to demonstrate the importance of
initialization.

Fig. 4. The Different Initial Posterior Probability to Elements in L1 and L0.
Example: We assign each L1 element the same posterior probabilities as E1 show in Figure 4, and
assign each L0 element the same posterior probabilities as E2 show in Figure 4. To prove deduction 1,
we set four situations as show in Table 4. We found that if E1 and E3 are found, and E2 and E4 are not
found, P(H1) is 0.9498, which is not much different from situation 1; but if E1 and E3 are not found,
and E2 and E4 are found, P(H1) is just 0.0935. Thus, it proves the deduction 1. Similarly, if we assume
all evidences in L1 are found and all evidences in L0 are not found, P(H) is 0.9935, which is still a
high value; but if all evidences in L1 are not found and all evidences in L0 are found, P(H) is only
0.0937. Thus is proves the importance of L1 evidences.

Table 4. The Impact of Critical Data
Situations E1, E3 E2,E4
1
Yes
Yes
2
No
No
3
Yes
No
4
No
Yes

P(H1)
0.9907
0.0180
0.9498
0.0935

6.5 Other Cloud Content Sharing Networks
Actually there exist many other cloud content sharing networks, such as Seagate FreeAgent GoFlex
Net Media Sharing (Engines), which represents the technologies that are hardware assisted, and
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supports transforming user’s storage device into personal cloud storage. In such GoFlex network, there
is no such origin server in CloudFront, but investigators need to investigate the user’s storage device
such as USB storage instead, because origin files exist in the USB storage. Other than that,
investigators can follow investigation process of CloudFront to find other evidences in GoFlex, and
build the Bayesian Network model.
7. CONCLUSION
Performing forensic to crime based on cloud content sharing network is new. We analyzed a typical
cloud content sharing network, and proposed guidances to track the origin file uploader and owner if
illegal sharing happens in such network. A Bayesian Network model is also built (section 5) for
analyzing the collected evidences to obtain a scientific evaluation result of the probability of a crime.
Analyses of model construction difficulties, initialization, sensitive data and critical data set are done.
One interesting result we found is that though the cloud SP is an important third party for providing
valuable evidences, its absence would not affect much of the probability of tracking the suspect when
other evidences are all found. If following the proposed guidances, there would be a chance of more
than 99% to track the origin file uploader and owner.
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